I negate and value morality, as ought implies a moral obligation.

Only ethical theories that appeal to practical rationality give agents a normative reason to act on moral statements. Other moral rules that appeal to an external standard not predicated on rational choice fail to guide action because agents can simply question why they ought to act morally. This implies that reason is a fact from which all obligation is derived. David Velleman[[1]](#footnote-1) explains:

As we have seen, **requirements that depend for their force on some external source of authority turn out to be escapable because the authority behind them can be questioned. We can ask, “why should I act on this desire?” or “why should I obey the** U.S. **government?” or** even “Why should I obey **God?”** And as we observed in the case of the desire to punch someone in the nose, **this question demands a reason for acting. The authority we are questioning would be vindicated, in each case, by the production of a sufficient reason.** What this observation suggests is that any purported source of practical authority depends on reasons for obeying it—and hence on the authority of reasons. Suppose, then, that we attempted to question the authority of reasons themselves, as we earlier questioned other authorities. Where we previously asked “Why should I act on my desire?” **let us now ask. “Why should I act for reasons?”** shouldn’t this question open up a route of escape from all requirements? As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, however, we can hear something odd in our question. **To ask “why should I?” is to demand a reason; and so to ask “why should I act for reasons?” is to demand a reason for acting for reasons. This demand implicitly concedes** the very authority that it purports to question—namely, **the authority of reasons.** Why would we demand a reason if we didn’t envision acting for it? **If we** really **didn’t feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so** certainly **wouldn’t help.** So **there is something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons.**

As a result, the ability to act assumes the authority of rational agents to autonomously make choices independent of a reason-based restriction. The ability to autonomously will is grounded in personhood and independence, as to take an action assumes the authority of action-taking, so a violation of autonomy denies the authority of reasons for taking actions.

Kantian ethics and respect for freedom demands the extension of voter enfranchisement. Allen Rosen[[2]](#footnote-2) explains,

Kant’s property qualification is without question a product of patterns of thought that now seem quaint at best, dangerously backward at worst. While it would be pointless to bludgeon Kant for failing to shake off the prejudices of his own age, there are more appropriate grounds for criticizing his property qualification, most notably hat it violates the spirit of his own conception of justice. In the Critique of Pure Reason, **Kant argues that a just constitution must permit the “greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom of each can co-exist with the freedom of all the others.**” As I noted before, **Kant defines humanity as power to set ends** (that is, the power of free choice). **Human freedom must therefore be understood as freedom of choice.** It seems plain, also , that the amount of **freedom of choice increases in** direct **proportion to the number** of people **who are allowed to exercise freedom of choice.** **Because voting gives a way of exercising freedom of choice, and because a just constitution requires the greatest possible freedom of choice, a just constitution must** surely **extend the electoral franchise to the greatest possible number**. By Kant’s own standards, therefore, only compelling reasons can justify excluding anyone for the franchise, for **every restriction on electoral freedom diminishes** the sum total of **human freedom**. To arrive at a convincing justification of Kant’s property qualification, it would be necessary to show that extending the franchise to economically dependent classes would make it impossible for the freedom of each subject to co-exist with the freedom of all others. Kant offers no such argument; nor is it likely that a plausible one could ever be found. Even within Kant’s own theory of justice, therefore, his property qualification lacks support or justification.

However affirming causes disenfranchisement functioning as a violation. Amanda Burgess-Proctor et al[[3]](#footnote-3) explains

Fourth, **youth who are tried** and convicted **as adults** may experience problems associated with criminal conviction (Bishop, 2000; Bishop et al., 1996; Gaarder & Belknap, 2002). For example, criminal conviction may have undesirable psychological consequences, as youth experience a “status transformation from **‘**redeemable youth’ to ‘unsalvageable adult’” (Bishop et al., 1996, p. 184). Indeed, such stigmatization also may explain higher recidivism rates among transferred youth (Bishop, 2000; Myers, 2003; Paternoster & Iovanni, 1989). In addition, convicted youth **may face civil sanctions including voter disenfranchisement, the inability to hold public office** or serve on a jury**, and reduced opportunities for legal employment** (Bishop & Frazier, 2000; Schindler & Arditti, 2001). **The issue** of voter disenfranchisement **is a particularly important consequence of transfer.** According to The Sentencing Project (2006), **48 states** and the District of Columbia **prohibit inmates from voting while serving a** felony **sentence, 36 states prohibit** felons from **voting while on parole, and three states** (i.e., Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia) **disenfranchise all ex-offenders** after they complete their sentences. Although **disenfranchisement** will not immediately affect convicted youth under the age of 18, it **may impact youth who reach the** legal **voting age while** still **on parole. Moreover,** underage **offenders convicted in states that remove the right** to vote **from** all **exfelons** face a future of civic and political disenfranchisement, as they **are permanently barred from voting.**

1. David. Velleman. Self To Self. 2006. Cambridge University Press. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Kant’s theory of Justice. Cornell University press. 1993. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. AMANDA BURGESS-PROCTOR[ School of Criminal Justice Michigan State University] KENDAL HOLTROP[ Department of Family and Child Ecology Michigan State University] FRANCISCO A. VILLARRUEL [Julian Samora Research Institute Michigan State University]. “Youth Transferred to Adult Court: Racial Disparity” <http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/YouthTransferred.pdf>. 2007 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)